During Climbout From COI...(click here)
AOPA STEPS UP EFFORTS
N9595W, a 1967 PA-140, departs Merritt Island Airport (COI) on
Runway 11. At 500 feet, the throttle is retarded to idle and
the aircraft makes an immediate turn to land on Runway 29. This
illustrates how quick headwork and practice can allow for a safe
landing in the event of a low altitude power loss.
The camera is mounted on the vertical stabilizer of N9595W
looking forward. N9595W is owned and piloted by Jan Zysko, NASA.
TO REDUCE FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS
Safety e-mail address for COI: Safety4COI@aol.com
The Crash of United Flight 232
Inclusion Idea From Ken Demmer
From: email@example.com (Robert Dorsett)
Subject: Haynes talk at Dryden
Date: 18 Jun 93 22:57:00 PDT
I got a few email inquiries about this, and it's been a year
or so since
it was last posted, so maybe it's time to post again. Enjoy!
(a Mac-formatted Word 4 copy is on rascal.ics.utexas.edu,
Ames Research Center
Dryden Flight Research Facility
The Crash of
United Flight 232
Capt. Al Haynes
May 24, 1991
Recording provided by:
Distributed with Capt. Haynes' permission.
Copyright (c) 1991 by Al Haynes. Unlimited non-profit
Robert "transcripts 'R' us" Dorsett
ATC = Air Traffic Control
CLR = Command Leadership Resource Training. i.e., Cockpit Resource
GPWS = Ground Proximity Warning System
NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board
PTS = Post-Traumatic Stress
UAL = United Airlines
?? = garbled. (xxxx ??) = my interpretation of garbled phrase.
Emcee: Good morning. Today, we're privileged to have Capt.
with us. He's a Texas A&M graduate, a Marine Corps flight
and a 35-year veteran of United Airlines. I think everyone probably
remembers that on July 19, 1989, United Airlines flight 232 departed
Denver at about 2:09 PM, climbed uneventfully to a cruise altitude
37,000', and at approximately 3:16, the flight notified ATC center
the #2 engine had failed. The aircraft was only marginally stable
that point, and this is the rest of the story.
[6-minute excerpt from Alert 3: The Crash of United Flight
ATC and ground communications]
[July 19, 1989: 15:23 hrs.]
Center: Sioux City, got an emergency for you. Got a United
coming in, lost #2 engine, having a hard time controlling the
right now, he's out of 29,000 right now, descending to Sioux
now. He's ?? VOR but he wants the equipment standing by right
Sioux City: Radar contact.
UAL 232: So you know we have almost no controllability. Very
elevator, and almost no ailerons, we're controlling the turns
power. I don't think we can turn right, I think we can only make
turns. ?? We can only turn right, we can't turn left.
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, understand, sir,you can only
UAL 232: that's affirmative.
Sioux City: 32 heavy, say souls on board, and fuel remaining.
UAL 232: We have 376, fuel ??
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, Sioux City.
UAL 232: Confirm we have no hydraulic fluid, which means we
elevator control, almost none, and very little aileron control.
serious doubts about making the airport. Have you got someplace
there, that we might be able to ditch? Unless we get control
airplane, we're going to put it down wherever it happens to be.
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, standby ??
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, say again. 232 heavy, think
able to hold about a 240 heading?
UAL 232: We're going to turn into it about right now.
Sioux City: When you turn to that 240 heading, sir, the airport
about oh, 12 o'clock and 38 miles.
UAL 232: Okay, we're trying to control it just by power alone,
no hydraulics at all, sir, we're doing our best, here.
Sioux City: Roger, and we've notified the equipment out in
too, sir. The equipment's here on the airport, standing by, and
they're sending some out to that area.
232. 232, we're going to have to continue in a right turn.
the elevators pretty much under control, but that's 3 or 4 hundred
feet, but still can't get much ?? steering.
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, understand you do have
elevators possibly under control, will you be able to hold altitude?
UAL 232: Negative, we don't have it. We're better, that's
Sioux City: Roger.
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, there's a small airport 12 o'clock
seven miles. The runway's 4000' long, there.
UAL 232: Control, ?? myself right now, soon as the captain
on, he'll give me a hand here. He's talking on the PA.
Sioux City: Roger.
UAL 232: United 232, we're starting a left turn back to the
Since we have no hydraulics, braking is going to really be a
I would suggest the equipment be ?? towards the far end of the
And I think under the circumstances, regardless of the condition
airplane when we stop, we're going to evacuate, so you might
ground crew that we're going to do that.
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, wilco, sir, and if you can continue
left turn, to about a 220 heading, sir, that'll take you right
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, you're going to have to widen
slightly to your left sir, to make the turn to final, and also
you away from the city.
UAL 232: Whatever you do, keep us away from the city.
Sioux City: 232 heavy, be advised, there is a four-lane highway
that area, sir, if you can pick that up.
UAL 232: Okay, we'll see what we can do, here. We've already
gear down, and we're going to have to be putting on something
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, airport's currently at
o'clock position, 10 miles.
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, if you can't make the airport,
there's an interstate that runs north to south to the east side
airport, it's a four-lane interstate.
UAL 232: We're just passing it right now. We're going to try
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger, and advise me when you
airport in site.
UAL 232: We have the runway in sight, and will be with you
Thanks a lot for your help.
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, winds currently 360 at 11, three
eleven, you're cleared to land on any runway.
UAL 232: You don't want to be particular and make it a runway,
Sioux City: ...010 at 11, and there's a runway that closed,
could probably work too, it runs northeast to southwest.
UAL 232: We're pretty much lined up on this one, here, I think
Sioux City: United 232 heavy, roger sir, that's a closed runway,
that'll work, sir. We're getting the equipment off the runway,
they'll line up to that one.
UAL 232: How long is it?
Sioux City: At the end of the runway is just a wide open field,
so the length won't be a problem.
UAL 232: OK.
[GPWS alarm on CVR]
[jumbled ground communications, followed by]
Ground #1: Orville, what's the situation out there?
Ground #2: ??
Ground #1: 10-4, you're going to need a lot of additional
out there, it sounds like?
Ground #2: 10-4, I've got engine 3, engine 5, and truck 3,
out to the scene, I'll advise you in just a few minutes.
Ground #1: 10-4, I'm going to go ahead and go en route out
there to the
command post. Let me advise anything that you need, I'll have
center go ahead and notify emergency hospitals and also the
MC: It's my sincere pleasure to introduce to you the person
on that video and you saw land the plane, Capt. Al Haynes.
Thank you, thank you very much. "Land" is a rather
loose term for
that. Anyone who has seen this video seems to have this one question
in their mind, and that is: how did anyone survive an accident
magnitude? I think there are five factors that contribute to
degree of success that we had at Sioux City: that is, luck,
communications, preparation, execution, and cooperation. And
like to talk about those five things today.
First of all, we all have our own personal beliefs and convictions,
I would never intrude on yours, so for the sake of discussion,
our first factor "luck." You may call it whatever you
wish. But what
did luck have to do with it? Well, first of all, how did we get
airplane to Sioux City? We're an aviation-oriented audience here
tonight, you basically have the idea of how an airplane works.
the #2 hydraulics on the DC-10 blew, or when the #2 engine blew,
took out the #2 accessory drive section, which took out the hydraulics
for the #2 system. And some 70 pieces of shrapnel penetrated
horizontal stabilizer and severed the #1 line and the #3 line,
and as a
result we ended up with no hydraulics. Now, the DC-10, like a
aircraft today, and those that'll be made in the future, has
going to the controls. You have no manual reversion in the airplane
all. The cables go to the servos, and then hydraulic pressure
your work. So in order to protect against the loss of all fluid,
of redundancies are built into the system. The DC-10, for instance,
has three completely independent hydraulic systems. They have
engine-driven pumps per system, their own hydraulic reservoir,
own supply lines, their own return lines, they are not connected
fluid-wise, in any way. They are connected mechanically, so that
shut down say, the #1 engine, the fluid in the #3 system runs
which runs a pump in the #1 system and the pressure's built right
up, and that's all automatic, you don't do anything about it.
you lose the fluid in the #1 system due to a leak in one of the
components, you won't lose the #2 and #3 system, because they're
all connected together, and all the major component flight controls
have at least two, some of them three, of the systems providing
to these controls. And then we have as the last resort an air-driven
generator which drops out of the bottom of the fuselage and runs
motor in the tail, that will provide hydraulic pressure to one
systems. So enough redundancy was built into the system to where
odds were placed at 1 to 10^9th power, or a billion to 1, that
hydraulic failure would occur. And that is satisfactory to where
considered fail-safe, if I guess is the word.
Well, on July 19th, Murphy's Law caught up with us, and we
did lose all
three systems. And as a result, we had no ailerons to bank the
airplane, we had no rudder to turn it it, no elevators to control
pitch, we had no leading-edge flaps or slats to slow the airplane
no trailing-edge flaps for landing, we had no spoilers on the
help us get down, or help us slow down, once we were on the ground.
And on the ground, we had no steering, nose wheel or tail, and
brakes. So what we had, is, what we kind of went through today,
of the simulators, was the throttles on #1 and #3 engine to control
us. And by manipulating those throttles, we were able to somewhat
control the heading, by skidding the airplane into a turn. And
controlling the pitch was just about out of the question. We
saying we think we had the elevators under control. We never
elevators under control. We thought we did, but we didn't. And
get into that, when I talk about reaction. So you see, with those
things to work with--one engine, and the other--just getting
airplane on the ground was a tremendous piece of luck. Amazing.
Because it has been tried again, and it didn't work. Everything
work in the right sequence, and it happened to work, so we got
airplane, at least, to an airport.
Another piece of luck was where we were. We could have been
Honolulu, or we could have been over the Rockies, or we could
been taking off from, say, New York's Kennedy Airport, right
Manhattan. So you see the trouble we could have had. As it was,
were over the relative flatlands over Iowa. And all of us, in
of our minds, you heard me on the tape, I had serious doubts
making the airport. Well, there were times when all four of us
serious doubts as to making the airport. But we knew in the back
our mind that where we were, if we had to ditch, we could probably
some fairly flat land, and we might have a chance of survival.
relieved a lot of pressure on us, in whether or not we were going
make the airport. At least we could get it on some pretty flat
another piece of luck in our case.
The weather was an amazing piece of luck. I just tried to
fly the F-15
simulator under moderate turbulence, and man, if we'd try to
this DC-10 under any kind of turbulence, we'd never have made
you are familiar in the Midwest, from the Canadian border to
of Mexico, in the summer time, there are usually a line of
thunderstorms that are doozies. We had one little build-up that
went around, but the rest was clear skies. 4500' scattered, and
ten miles visibility was the weather, so it was amazing that
weather was that good. A year to the day later, when we went
a memorial service, there was a huge thunderstorm over Sioux
directly over the airport. Had that been there a year before,
never had made the airport. So the weather was a tremendous factor.
The time of day was also very advantageous, in two ways: 1,
it was day,
we could see what we were trying to find. To try find an airport
seventy miles away at night over strange territory would be very
difficult. By having, especially if it had been runway 22, because
there are no lights on that runway. It's a closed runway, it's
used, so the lights are not operative. As it was, it was daytime,
could see what we were doing, we found the airport four or five
out, we were able to see it, and direct ourselves in that general
direction. So that was very important. But more important to
of day was that it was right at shift-change time for the hospitals.
Marion health center, which happens to be a regional trauma center,
St. Luke's, which happens to be a regional burn center, and are
located in Sioux city, were just changing their shifts, and so
were double-shifted for our arrival. Not only that, but all the
clinics and health centers around town were all releasing their
from work, and of course with a 45-minute notice, about a 30-minute
notice that we were going to Sioux City, that was broadcast on
radio, and all these emergency services were able to head to
hospital, they had so many volunteers at the hospital, they had
them away. They had more than they could use.
And the last piece of luck, which turned out to be very fortunate
the crew, and you'll see why in a minute, it was Wednesday, the
of the month when the Air National Guard at Sioux City was on
285 trained National Guardsmen were at the airport, waiting for
when we got there. So, you can see how the luck factor was way
for us. Some of the other crews who have had accidents, the luck
factor was down here. Our luck ran out about fifty feet in the
but it lasted for a long time.
So luck played a very important part in getting the airplane
City, and having the survival rate that we did have.
The second big factor was communications. We had quick response
ATC, MSP center was the one we were talking to, they quickly
over to this extremely calm young man that you just heard, Kevin
Bockman. He's a controller that happened to be on the radar station
approach control when we turned it over. I met Kevin personally,
the White House about a month later, and when I finally could
him--we couldn't say much, the first time we met--but when I
could, I learned he had moved to Sioux City because he found
previous duty station too stressful [laughter]. And he was looking
something a little quieter. I haven't the foggiest idea where
now--he's not in Sioux City.
But the calmness of his voice, the communications with him
outstanding. The DME did not work at Sioux City that day, and
it's not on this tape, the cockpit voice recorder shows numerous
we were asking where we were in relation to the airport and how
and he was right there every second giving us every bit of information,
he picked out airports we could go to, runways, highways we could
on. The highway state patrol even blocked one of the freeways
it open for us, if we'd had to land on it, going out to the airport.
Communications in the air was tremendous. Probably what helped
most was the fact that the second officer, Dudley Dvorak--I asked
to get ahold of San Francisco area maintenance, that's maintenance
experts sitting in San Francisco for each type of equipment that
flies. They have all the computers, all the logbook history,
history of the aircraft, all the other information that they
on to help a crew that has a problem. Well, unfortunately, in
case, there wasn't anything they could help us with. Every time
tried to find something that we could do, we had either already
it, or couldn't do it, because we had no hydraulics. The hardest
problem that Dudley had was convincing them that we didn't have
hydraulics. "Oh, you lost number two," "No, we
lost all three," "Oh
you lost number three," "No, we've lost all of them,"
one and two work," "No," well we went on like
this for quite a while,
before he finally convinced them we didn't have anything, and
told them that, that was all they could do, and I was a little
with them at first, when I first had Dudley stop communicating
them and turn around for the landing, I was a little ticked,
realized how frustrating it must have been for these four or
people, there, with all those computers, with all the knowledge
their fingertips, that they could possibly draw on, and there's
absolutely nothing they could do to help a crew. That's got to
extremely frustrating for them. And I have not yet had a chance
down and see them and apologize for what I was thinking, but
at least I
didn't say it out loud. [laughter]
But Dudley's communications with them did two things--it alerted
crisis center in Chicago, and it alerted our dispatch center
Chicago. And those two facilities, knowing that we were going
City, were able to prepare for our arrival in Sioux City. In
they pulled a 727 out of the hangar in Chicago, loaded it with
and there just happened to be a meeting in our executive offices
day, of our union, and the company, and some other people, and
those people who would be involved in accidents were at the center,
all they did was run and get on this airplane, and fly to Sioux
and they were in Sioux City before I was admitted in my room
hospital. So it was very quick response at the company in getting
support people and equipment there, all through the communications
Dudley was able to do. So that communications was very important.
When we declared an emergency, which Bill did, the copilot,
declared an emergency, everything stopped on the ground. Everything
went to us. They cleared the frequency for us, they gave us all
help they could get. I don't know how many light airplane pilots
have here today, but I've talked to several groups of several
and this one you can pass on Mary, they're afraid to say anything,
don't like to declare an emergency, they're afraid their' going
cause some problems or something like that. And they said to
you have all these resources of United Airlines at your disposal,
the center, and all this. So do you Three words: I'm declaring
emergency, and you've got it. All the help you want. You've got
American Airline's maintenance facility, United maintenance facility,
if you stay in the air long enough, they'll patch you through
and you can talk to them. So you've got all kinds of help, if
do that. Now, if you do that, and then land, and nothing happens,
you've got a lot of reports to fill out, and you're going to
have a lot
of airline pilots that are upset at you, especially at a place
Chicago, because they're out holding, while they're getting you
ground. And you'll probably hear about it. But in truth, and
I've said this, the pilots, yeah, they shake their heads, yeah,
going to complain, but they're really glad you made it, and they're
very happy you're able to use the services available to you.
communicate with the ground, tell them your problem, and they'll
you. They really will.
The communications in the cockpit among ourselves, we'll talk
that under reactions, we'll talk about. The communications between
cockpit and the cabin. Very little, actually, because when I
the ?? flight attendant up--a very single flight attendant--and
said she took one look the cockpit and she knew we didn't have
emergency--we had an enormous crisis. And her thought then was,
at altitude, we've got some time, he told me to go back and prepare
cabin. I'll do that, and I won't bother them. And I'm sure he'll
communicate with me again. And that's what happened. They didn't
us. We called them when we had a problem, when we were ready
So that the communications, while it was not there, it was good,
because it wasn't necessary. And the training did that.
The inter-communications between response units on the ground,
tape that you just saw is a six- minute excerpt from a 54-minute
called Alert 3, and there's about fifteen minutes of communications
this tape prior to this crash that you just saw. And there's
a lot of
ground communications between emergency response units and the
hospital. Excellent communications in that respect. I'll grant
that the 20-minute warning time that we gave them, that we were
to Sioux City was a great help to them, a great benefit to them.
any of you serve on emergency rescue stuff, or volunteer fire-fighters,
you know that if you're in station and ready to go, it's a lot
than being home or something and having to respond. So the twenty
minutes we gave them, they were able to put their disaster plan
effect. In fact, I believe it was fifteen minutes before we crashed,
the tower changed the alert from alert 2, which is "an aircraft
its way with problems," to alert 3. And alert 3 means "an
crashed." That's how much confidence they had in us. [laughter].
fifteen minutes notice of an airplane has crashed. So all the
communications were put into motion for an airplane has crashed.
hospital was notified. They called Des Moine and said we were
need more medical supplies. They were actually loading another
National Guard plane in Des Moine and took it off shortly after
crashed, heading to the airport with supplies. So, communications
advance notice. Very, very important.
The preparation: how do you prepare for something like this?
I gave a
talk at Anchorage to the Alaska Air Safety Foundation and they
subtitled my talk: disaster in the air, are you ready? No, you're
never ready. But you might be prepared. And that's one of the
that I'm going around the country doing this, hoping that I can
message out to be prepared. And the preparation for the ground
for the emergency rescue unit was: in 1987 they had a drill,
pretended a wide- body aircraft crashed on this closed runway
City, and they had 150 survivors, and they had this drill, and
found some shortcomings in the drill, which most drills do. They
these once every three years, FAA mandated, live drill, and a
drill every year, and this was their year for their drill, and
decided to have a crash. They'd had a bus crash from the time
So in this airplane crash, they found a lot of things they were
One, they didn't take in enough community. If you're going to
survivors, you're going to need more equipment than the class
airport that Sioux City is. It's not classified for wide-bodied
aircraft, so they don't have to have quite the emergency response
that larger airports would have. So they had to rely on the outlying
communities. And Gary Brown, the director of services, brought
community people in, made them a part of his plan. They attended
meetings, they attended the practices that they were having,
was putting their input into this plan.
He also brought in a very important unit, the Post-Traumatic
Unit. Now, I was never one to believe much in post-traumatic
I had heard it a lot in WWII, from Korean, and Vietnam veterans,
thought, well, okay, if such a thing exists, I'll let it go,
don't really believe it. I believe it now. And I'm asking you
believe it. It may never happen to you--I'm fortunate enough
have suffered PTS--yet. But it can happen tomorrow. I was a little
concerned about flying simulators under these conditions because
afraid it might key something up. But no problem. I've been very
fortunate. But it does exist. And it exists. It happens to not
victims of the crash. The 185th suffered a tremendous amount
So did the people of Sioux City. So did the staff of the hospital.
PTS has to start at the scene of the accident. Fortunately, Sioux
was prepared for that. It was part of their preparation in getting
things done. Because even though they'd practiced this wide-bodied
aircraft that they didn't have, on July 19, we put a wide- bodied
aircraft on the very same runway they used for practice, and
them 200 survivors to start with, instead of 150, so having a
having a plan, and taking it seriously, and working on it, is
very important for any community, no matter what size you are,
Up in Alaska, a lot of the pilots said, well you know, we're
up here in
the bush, and we don't have these things. They're the main
trans-continental stop for aircraft going to Japan. And an aircraft
not going to happen right over the major airport. It can happen
anywhere out in the tules. I'm not calling Sioux City a tule,
never do that, [laughter] but in Alaska, you've got a lot of
there. But it can happen anywhere, so everybody has to be as
as they can be. And they were on the ground at Sioux City.
They had a plan that they worked on, and they left some flexibility
open in it that it could be changed, and when we get to the reaction,
I'll talk about that also.
The flight attendants: they were prepared by their training
have at Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco. That's where flight
attendants have their recurrent training. They go back once a
they go through all the emergency drill preparation, how to open
doors, what they're all supposed to do, how to prepare the cabin,
to prepare the passengers. We have a 767 simulator in Denver
they've got about 40 seats in. And we'd go down there in one
sessions, and we'd sit in that simulator and several of the attendants
are assigned the job of working and about somewhere on takeoff
shortly after takeoff we have a crash. The simulator tips over
side, it fills up with smoke, it darkens just like it would on
airplane, there's fires outside some of some of the doors, it's
realistic, and it's the kind of training that they give the flight
attendants, and it paid off. Each one of them, in a tape they
later, said the training that we had, the training that we had,
kept saying it. So training is very very important. Sometimes
sometimes repetitious, but it's very important.
As for the crew, there was no training procedure for hydraulic
failure. Complete hydraulic failure. We've all been through one
failure or double failures, but never a complete hydraulic failure.
the preparation that paid off for the crew was something that
started in 1980 called Cockpit Resource Management, or Command
Leadership Resource Training, or any number of things that you
call it. I think we called it CLR to start with. All the other
airlines are now using it. Up until 1980, we kind of worked on
concept that the captain was THE authority on the aircraft. What
said, goes. And we lost a few airplanes because of that. Sometimes
the captain isn't as smart as we thought he was. And we would
to him, and do what he said, and we wouldn't know what he's talking
about. And we had 103 years of flying experience there in the
trying to get that airplane on the ground, not one minute of
had actually practiced, any one of us. So why would I know more
getting that airplane on the ground under those conditions than
other three. SO if I hadn't used CLR, if we had not let everybody
their input in, it's a cinch we wouldn't have made it. It was,
know if any of you remember the old movie Marty, I kind of refer
that, it was Ernest Borgnine, and a group of his cronies, trying
find something to do on a Saturday night, and they said, what
want to do Marty, and he said, i don't know, what do you want
Joe, and that's kind of the way we flew the airplane now. What
want to do, I don't know, and let's try this, and you think that'll
work, beats me, and that's about the way it went, really. If
the cockpit voice recorder transcript, there's a lot of that
When are we going to put the gear down, I don't know, how are
to put it down, well, we do two things, two ways to get it down,
one we're going to use, that type of thing. So CLR really paid
And CLR is being taken out into other areas. I think it was originally
a management course anyway, but now it's being spread all over.
going next year to Harrisburg, PA to talk to the Nuclear Power
Association. Because they are beginning the CLR concept in their
control rooms. There have five stations in a control room. You
nuclear disaster, you want those people working together, you
want them working separately. So CLR that we had really prepared
crew for what happened.
If you recall the zip-top 737 over at Hawaii, the Aloha, Bob
used CLR to its utmost, because they could not communicate with
other. They used hand signals to point the things they wanted
That's how they got that airplane on the ground. Flight 811,
out of Honolulu, on its way to Sidney, blew the cargo door and
engines on the right side, and did damage to the flaps and hydraulics,
they used CLR to get the airplane back to Honolulu. They had
overweight airplane that couldn't maintain altitude with two
out on one side, and by using CLR and the crew working together,
everybody putting their input in, they got the airplane back.
of the captain being the ultimate authority is gone. He may be
authority on the airplane, he may sign for the papers and all
you don't work that way.
I think Sister Margaret (?? Wicks) said it the best, she's
City's (Briar Cliff ??) College, I'll talk about her in a minute,
statement was, when you've got a crisis like this, and got so
diverse things going on, let those in charge take charge. Don't
one individual try to run the whole show. Let those who know
how to do
their specialties handle those things, and you'll get things
that's what happened.
Execution: how did we execute? Well, first of all, how did
we do it in
the air? Not having any experience at all in flying an airplane
those conditions, our basic problem was keeping the airplane
in the sky
and trying to find an airport. Besides losing all of our hydraulics,
which gave us no control, we had two other problems, a problem
was not really familiar with, maybe you are, I know an awful
lot of you
are engineers here, is a term called "phugoid." What
a phugoid is, an
airplane wants to fly its trim speed. And as soon as you cut
one engine, you lose speed, the nose drops, airspeed starts to
you'll go through that speed, the nose will come back up, you'll
through the speed again on the slow side, and you'll just oscillate
like this. Maybe you can stop it, maybe you can't. The way you
to stop it, is, we found out. Not as much as we know now, a lot
this is after-the-fact knowledge, we weren't this smart in the
But we found that in order to stop a phugoid, you had to do the
opposite of what you would normally do. When the aircraft reached
apex and started down, you had to add power, as the speed built
you'd have to actually add power to create lift in the wings
to get the
nose to pitch up. The hardest thing to do though was as the nose
up and started to slow down, and you're approaching a stall,
to close the throttles. And that's very difficult to do. We found
out, though, that's what we had to do. Another thing that added
problem, though, was that the damage to the tail was such that
aircraft constantly wanted to roll to the right. If we left the
alone, the aircraft would roll over. When the engine failed,
immediately took hold of the aircraft. Bill is the copilot 26
flying, he's been with National/Pan Am, came over to United when
acquired the Pacific flying. Very competent pilot, I'd flown
a month before, had no qualms about him flying at all. And when
grabbed ahold of the yoke, he demonstrated step one in any emergency
procedure: that somebody fly the airplane.
We've lost several airplanes because everybody was working
problem and nobody was flying the airplane. One of them was down
the Everglades. Everybody was working on the problem and the
flew into the ground. Not to criticise the pilots, because everybody
wants to do their share to get the problem solved. But somebody
got to fly the airplane. Bill immediately took hold of the airplane,
immediately called ATC and said we lost an engine and had to
lower altitude, was turning off the airway, all those things
supposed to do. So my attention now is diverted to Dudley to
At United we don't use much memory items in emergency procedures,
use mostly checklists, and severe engine failure in flight is
textbook. So Dudley got out his book and the first thing it said
close the throttle. And when I tried to pull the throttle back,
wouldn't come back. Now, I've never shut an engine down in flight
jet, so I didn't know that when you pulled the throttle back,
come back. In the simulator, when you do it, it always came back.
This one wouldn't come back. Dave says, well, try the fuel. The
step is to shut the fuel off. I tried to shut the fuel off, and
fuel lever wouldn't move. So something was binding these controls.
now we know the damage to the tail, there's damage back there
than just the engine failing. We did get the fuel shutoff by
down on the firewall shutoff. Which shut off all the electrics
hydraulics to the engine. And then the fuel went off, whether
coincidental, or it had actually helped it, I don't know, but
that time, it went off. Well, now we'd been about 15 or 20 seconds
into our problem. And bill says to me, Al, I can't control the
airplane. Now I divert my attention from down here, shutting
engine, to up here, on the instrument panel. First thing I notice
Bill had full left aileron control, calling for a full left turn.
You'd never see that anywhere on a DC-10, much less at 35,000'.
also got the yoke right back in his lap. And the only time to
is to do that is to embarrass the captain on the ground and hit
captain in his fat stomach before he can get it out of the way.
never there in the air. So that catches my attention real quick.
what really got my attention was will a full left turn called
a full nose up called for, we were in a descending right turn.
tell all pilots around that this is when I said the dumbest thing
ever said in my life, I said, "I got it." I didn't
have it very long.
Because we immediately determined that we could not control the
airplane: it wouldn't respond to the inputs of the crew. At this
we were in a right bank, the bank was increasing, we were up
degrees of bank, we closed the #1 throttle completely, and firewalled
the #3 throttle, and very slowly, the wing came back up. And
times on our attempt to get to the ground, we got to 38 degrees
bank, and we were doing just what those who were running those
went to this morning to just fly an airplane with just the throttles,
we were overpowering the airplane, over-controlling because panic
one thing, although we didn't appear to be panicked, not having
idea what we were doing was another, and an airplane about to
its back at 35,000' is pretty scary, so you just do anything
you can to
make it stop.
But by manipulating the throttles this way we kept the wings
level--for a while--then we had to start down. Well, we felt--like
everyone else--that this cannot happen--you cannot lose all the
hydraulics in a -10. That's been told us from time when. When
first sat down and they said this isn't hooked up to anything
move the wheel) we said, well, what's going to make this fly,
it, well--it can't, it can't happen, it--just, you can't lose
hydraulics. And we believed it like everybody else. And now while
were reasonably sure we weren't accomplishing anything with the
we kept flying the yoke. The problem is, it kept both of us,
the yoke. We couldn't do it, just one of us couldn't do it. Now
flying the yoke with both hands, and all four hands, now we had
operate the throttles, and we had to do them, let go of the yoke,
a throttle, let go of the yoke, move a throttle, and so forth.
known what we know now, I don't know if we would let go of the
even now. To let go of the yoke completely is extremely difficult
do. After almost 40 years of flying airplanes and holding onto
something, not having something to hold on to--I don't know if
do that. But what we found out is that it was very difficult
the throttles. And I was about to have Dudley turn around and
over the throttles--and I'm glad we didn't because we would have
all that communications, if he had--we were told there was a
captain in the back, who was an instructor, and we like to think
instructors know more than we do--so I figured maybe Denny knew
something that we didn't, so we asked Captain Fisch to come up.
he took one look at the cockpit, and that's his knowledge. It
of funny listening to, reading the transcript, because he's about
fifteen minutes behind us now, and he's trying to catch up, and
everything he says to do we've already done. And after about
minutes--that's 20 minutes into this operation--he says, "We're
trouble!" We thought: that's an amazing observation, Denny
[laughter]. And we kid him about it, but he's just trying to
with our thinking--we're 15 min. ahead of him, but he asks--when
found out that he didn't have any knowledge for us, he says,
can I do?" I said, you can take these throttles, and try
to help us
with the throttles. So what he did, he stood between us--not
the floor, as the news media said--and he took one throttle in
hand, and now he could manipulate the throttles together. With
throttle frozen, we couldn't get ahold of the throttles together.
he could. And we said, give us a right bank, bring the wing up,
too much bank, try to stop the altitude, he'd try to respond.
after a few minutes of doing this, everything we'd do with the
could correspond with the throttles. So it was a synchronized
between the three of us, with Dudley still being able to do all
communications. So that's how we operated the airplane, and that's
we got it on the ground.
And if I can have the slides on now, I'll show you how we
got it on the
ground. That's why we can't call it a landing.
This the pattern we flew. That's the radar tracking we flew.
coming along like this and were just turning back toward Debuke,
when we lost the engine. And this straight line, reasonably straight
line that we fly here, here's the line of just trying to keep
airplane upright, while we were trying to figure what was going
Somewhere up in here, and I can't see it from here, there's three
definite slash-marks, and that's where the airplane almost went
its back. As Denny came up and took over, and we began to descend,
we determined now we were going to Sioux City, they wanted us
to go to
Des Moines, and that was over 170 miles away, and there was no
were going to keep the airplane in the air that long. So when
declared an emergency, and they gave us the nearest suitable
it was only 70 miles away, now we had to get down, and we did
through this series of right turns. Some of these we did, others
airplane did on its own, and all we did was keep it from doing
more. So we made these right turns. When the NTSB came in to
us, they said, why did you make a left turn? And all four of
we never made a left turn. Even though I said we were starting
turn back to the airport, we all four swore we never made a left
turn. That looks like a left turn [laughter]. And what we determined
was, we remembered then, after a while that we all four remembered
there was a build-up about right there, and we had to get around
build-up, not go through it. So we did that. This, right there,
that last 360 degree right turn, we were too low for the radar
it up. Then we came in.
There's the airport for Sioux City, Sioux City gateway airport.
is runway 22, this is runway 31. What Kevin was trying to do,
could only make right turns was bring us in, the city was right
here somewhere. Bring us in this way, a right turn, into the
The way things turned out, it was probably good we didn't do
we been able to make the runway, at the end of runway 31 was
Missouri river. So we might have been better off had we not been
to stop or something, to land on something like this. When I
runway was, he doesn't say so on the tape, but he did tell us
it was, 6600', and then he said at the end was a wide-open field.
our scenario was, probably what we do was land, and hopefully
our gear, go off the end of the runway, shear our gear, and go
belly. If we did go sideways, since we couldn't steer it, and
have a quartering tail-wind that was turning us left to right
the runway, we might go off into the field and shear it en route.
kind of hoped we would do that. We came pretty close to the runway.
We got the right wing tip in the center of the runway, the right
gear off to the side. We touched down on the right wing tip,
flap fairing, the #3 engine, the one on the right side, the right
gear, and the nose wheel, all pretty much simultaneously. The
wing broke off--that's the reason for the fire here, spilling
fuel. The right main gear separated from the airplane. The left
stayed on. And the airplane slammed on the ground, and we did
and cartwheel, like all the news says. We hit and slid on the
on the left main gear and the right wing stub. Slid along sideways,
for about 2000' or so, when the left wing came up. Also, on impact,
the tail broke off, the entire tail section of the aircraft broke
so there's no weight in the tail at all. So when the left wing
up--probably because of our speed--the tail came up. the aircraft
up on its nose, bounced on the runway three times, on the nose,
radome marks on the runway. We went upside down and airborne
right here. We were thinking--even that tape that you see there,
that's all we have in the way of tape, and nobody really remembers,
there was so much fire and smoke that nobody could tell. We hit
about here, and upside down. And fortunately for us, the cockpit
off, and unfortunately for the first-class cabin. And then the
aircraft went over on its back and skidded to a halt right over
This is our point of impact, where the right main gear touched
That concrete is 12" thick, and the hole is 18" deep.
land the DC-10 at approximately 140 knots. We were doing 215
accelerating. You normally touch down at about 200-300 feet per
at the most, as a rate of descent. We were doing 1850 feet per
minute. And increasing. And you normally like to go straight
runway, and we were drifting left and right because of the quartering
tail-wind. Of ten knots, which gave us ten knots more of speed,
hit the ground.
I'm showing you these for several reasons. One, is to show
you can survive an airplane crash, because we had survivors in
piece of wreckage. That's the first-class cabin. We actually
of our dead-heading pilots sitting in the back of the first-class
go out a window. I said, you can't go out a window. He said,
can. [laughter] When you realize you're upside down and the thing's
fire, you can get out a window. [laughter]. We did lose most
people, unfortunately, but they did survive. Some of them did
This is the tail section of the aircraft, which, shows it
here. It broke off, and went straight down the runway, while
the rest of the aircraft curved off to the right. We had about
row, three or four rows of seats right here, and two flight attendants,
who survived this part of the accident. I've always been concerned
about a DC-10, it's concerned me that the engine, sitting on
top of the
tail, as it was, if the engine blew, you might lose the whole
Well, after all that happened to this airplane, that engine housing
still sitting there. So Douglas put that on to stay.
It's the main portion of the aircraft, it's upside down, and
of course, after the fire. This is the forward part of the aircraft,
and this is the aft portion. And this is where most of our survivors
came from. Unfortunately, 34 were trapped back in here, and died
to smoke inhalation, but most came from right here.
In case you don't recognize that, that's the cockpit. There's
metal, no glass, nothing to indicate that's the cockpit. They're
guessing that 35 minutes after the crash, we were ignored. They
that was an uninhabitable part of the avionics compartment. Because
all that was holding that airplane together was the wires. Or
that piece of stuff together was the wires. That gentleman in
hat is talking to me. The gentleman without his hat on is talking
the copilot, Bill ?? and you can see a little bit of Bill's shirt
there, and the four of us are right there. And that area is normally
about ten feet high. Counting the cockpit and the avionics
compartment. That's directly behind my seat. So that's where
In the rescue operation, They came in and tried the jaws of life.
put it on Bill's side, and as they did it put pressure on my
I happened to be conscious at the time. And I strongly recommended
they stop doing that [laughter]. So they came on to my side,
my side, and Bill did the same thing. Bill's seat had collapsed,
back of the seat, with him inside it. He had eight broken ribs,
broken ribs, and a broken pelvis. So he was in a little bit of
So what they did was they came up with the idea to bring a fork-lift
over, and run the chains, the heavy chains you saw, straight
lift the cockpit straight up. And by doing this raised the cockpit
this height, and pulled us all out of the bottom. That's how
us out of the airplane.
And to say a lot for Douglas and the seat manufacturers, that's
seat. All four of the seats stayed together. All four of the
seatbelts and harnesses--they had to cut us out to get us out.
the only thing that saved our lives, I'm sure, was that those
That was the reaction of the crew, how we got the airplane
How did the ground people react? Well, the ground crew did
what they had been trained to do. By having advance notice they
in the position to put all the aircraft, all the emergency vehicles
a spot in a designated area, and then dispatch them as they were
needed. We only gave them two minutes to line up for runway 22.
were all set up for runway 31. And when I told Kevin we saw this
runway ahead of us, and that's where we were going to land, he
minutes to get the equipment off the runway. They were actually
positioned on that runway, and we could see them moving off that
runway. That's the reason the video is no better than it was.
all the notice we had, everyone was set up for runway 31. The
hangars that are built right off to the left of runway 22 were
after the airport was closed, and you can't see the runway from
tower. And that's where the operator was. So he went clearing
the steps, and if you've ever tried to get down tower steps in
it's a long way down, and that's as far as he could get, before
The first part of the video was taken by a home video camera,
us in the air.
But that picture in the air is very deceiving. It looks like
everything pretty much in control. We were starting a down phugoid,
and starting a right bank, 300' in the air. And we just, that's
our luck ran out. We just ran out of altitude, trying to correct
We had the time in the air, trying to correct it. But that close
the ground, we didn't have time. In an attempt to stop the phugoid
the turn, Dennis added power, and unfortunately the left engine
up faster than the right, the first time in the day we noticed
happened, and the bank increased. And in four seconds, we went
four degrees of right bank, to twenty degrees of right bank,
the ground. However, safety experts say the tumbling of the aircraft
probably saved a lot of lives. It took up most of the inertia,
the shock, and allowed the people to get out of the airplane.
But we were talking about reaction, now. The emergency crews
as they were trained to do. The preparation was the big thing
reaction time. The tower switching to the alert three way ahead
time really set the wheels in motion, and their reaction there
that they knew it was going to be bad, and they were able to
We had at the hospital an unusual situation. There were so
doctors there, and nurses, that the director was trying to figure
what to do with all these people. So came up with an idea: he
line, and he put a doctor, a nurse, and a tech, and they formed
regardless of the doctor's specialty, they all had medical training,
it didn't matter what it was. They had psychiatrists, they had
obstetricians, pediatricians, they had everything in this line.
then when they brought the ambulance up, and pulled the gurney
the ambulance, well, this survivor already been through triage
airport, he already had EMT care all the way in to the hospital,
now he had a doctor, a nurse, and a tech on him immediately,
stayed with him until they were either sent to a room, released,
whatever was done with them. So the medical care was instantaneous
continuous, and that was through a preparation, and little bit
flexibility that the plan had that they could use in it.
The other flexibility in the plan was: where was everybody
stay. I usually get in rouble with the media for saying this,
that notice that came out that we were going into Sioux City,
broadcast that there was an aircraft was over Sioux City, and
way in, and that there was a problem. And all the news media
interested in this. So they reserved all the rooms in all the
in Sioux City. So when the survivors started getting through,
being released several hours later, there was no place to put
And one of the doctors at St. Lukes looked up at Briar Cliff
which sits up here on a hill overlooking Sioux City, and call
Margaret Wicks, and see if she could do anything. It was summer,
they had a skeleton crew there of a small summer staff. Yeah,
something. By nightfall, she had 250 people in her dormitory.
reaction of everybody was just fantastic.
Which brings us to the fourth thing, the fifth one, rather,
cooperation. The cooperation that took place was outstanding.
unbelievable. First of all, we start with us in the cockpit.
effort with the four of us. This is Dudley Dvorak, the second
officer. This is his first month in the DC-10. He had just had
initial operating experience flight. This was his first time
10. Bill ?? has flown a lot of 1011's for Pan Am, and he flew
for United when he first came over, and then switched to the
of experience in three-engined aircraft, but none in what we
doing. But that was his experience. Mine, I had about 7,000 hours
the DC-10. I spent about nine years as a copilot in the DC-10.
flying to Honolulu, and was getting 14 days a month on the beach
at the company expense, and I saw no reason to go to work, I
a copilot. laughter But I had a lot of time in the 10. Denny
DC-10 instructor, but what we didn't know was it was his first
second month as an instructor in the 10. But what we had was,
said, was 103 years of experience, but that showed in the way
reacted to the problem. The way we cooperated with each other,
getting things done. Everybody throwing out a suggestion. And
came time to put the gear time, it was one of the big problems
that--not problems, but the way we used CLR, and cooperation
crew. There are two ways we can get the gear down on the DC-10
hydraulic failure. You can put the gear handle down, which manually
unlocks the doors and the doors fall open and the gear just falls
because it's been resting on the doors. Or, there's an alternate
method of doing that, when you use no flaps. Because we have
ailerons on the DC- 10. You fly with the inboard ailerons at
speed, and then you unlock the outboard ailerons for landing
lower the flaps. Well, we didn't have any flaps. So we couldn't
unlock the outboard ailerons. So that's what this alternate gear
method is for. And we talked about this: how do we put the gear
and it was suggested, we unlock with the outboard ailerons, with
alternate gear, because there might be something out there, because
might be able to get some fluid out there, there might be some
out there. So this was all talked about. The one thing we all
upon was that the gear was going down. Because we had to have
absorber. Something had to absorb that shock. With the rate of
descents that we had, I was afraid if we had touched down as
without the gear, we would have just exploded. And if we'd had
higher rate of descent than we had, because we had higher rates
descents somewhere during this time, than we actually had when
touched down. So the gear was going down but the CLR and cooperation
of the crew on how to do it.
The cooperation between the cabin and the cockpit crew was
good. We had some communications gaps there because of our attention
to duty that we could not turn. I never turned around to the
attendant, looked at her while I talked. In fact, when the second
after the accident, I asked to go see the rest of the crew, and
put me in a wheelchair and wheeled me down to intensive care
and Dudley were, I mean Bill and Dennis, and as they were taking
Dennis Fitch's room, this captain came up to help us, and I thought,
there's more than one captain in the room, I won't know what
like. He stood right here, for thirty minutes, and sat down,
worked the throttles for us for landing, and I haven't the foggiest
idea what the man looked like, because I never looked back and
at him. But he was the only one in the room, so it made it a
easier to find out who he was. But that's the way our communications
was--we had to communicate without looking at each other. The
came up and did her thing, went back. The cooperation among her
group--the procedure for United is, when you're going to have
emergency preparation, you call all the flight attendants together,
aide does, the senior flight attendant, she briefs them, then
out to their duty demonstrations, and demonstrate, and tell what
want done. When this engine blew, it was so loud, and so violent--they
even heard it on the ground-- everyone in the aircraft knew.
that, I had channel 9 on, and everyone with a headset on channel
knew we'd lost an engine because they were listening to ATC.
Fortunately, I got it off, before we got to the really bad stuff.
of the survivors even commented, "We were listening until
turned us off," he says. They didn't know how badly we really
until we told them later. But, what Jan decided to do was, go
there, and brief each station individually. Because, bringing
together, she thought, would upset the passengers. Any more than
already were. And by their doing this, the cooperation between
and the passengers was outstanding. It was children's day
unfortunately, on United, we had some 30 children on the airplane,
lot of them traveling by themselves. What the flight attendants
were ask the adults to move, so that there was at least one adult
sitting next to every child. And the passengers cooperated without
hesitation. When they selected the people to sit by the emergency
exits, they all responded very quickly. Great cooperation. And
the airplane crashed--after the crash--several of the flight
were assisted getting out of their harness by the passengers.
they were upside down in their harnesses as well as their belt
couldn't get the belt to loosen. John Trance who helped one of
out, Gary Priest who helped one of them out. You've heard--I
remember this story, I'm sure you do if I recall it. There was
infant, that was separated from her parents. And one of our survivors,
Gary (Schimel ??), was just leaving the airplane, getting out
thing, full of smoke, fire ?? and he hard the baby crying. And
back into the airplane, searching for the baby, found her in
overhead bin, she'd actually been thrown up into an overhead
took her out. So that's the kind of way the passengers responded
cooperated with everybody.
I've talked about what ATC did, I've talked about what the
they helped. The surrounding areas. They actually called these
outlying cities, when we said we might not make the airport,
there's a DC-10 headed your way, coming for the airport, and
actually dispatch trucks out to the highway, to look for us,
so if they
found us, and we didn't make the airport, at least there'd be
there. I'm not familiar with mutual aid too much, but I know
exists, and I've seen pictures where a fire truck is sitting
county line while a house across the street burns because they
have mutual aid. They threw mutual aid out the window: they didn't
even consider it. That was part of their plan: that they wouldn't
worry about mutual aid, we'll have response, then we'll worry
mutual aid end of it, who's going to get paid for what they did.
that's the way they cooperated with each other.
Marion Health Center, their north campus, which is their mental
campus, their emergency post-traumatic stress program. I was
did you get any therapy while you were in the hospital? I said
don't think so. They said, no psychiatrists or psychologists
said oh yeah, but all they did was come to the room and talk.
[laughter] Then it dawned on me just exactly what therapy is.
I woke up in the hospital, when I first really remembered what
going on, there was a gentleman holding my hand. Of course, the
thing I looked for was the security guard with my wallet, and
he had it
in his hand. But this guy was holding my hand, and he said, "I'm
doctor (Pensy ??), I'm the staff psychologist." And he was
from the time I woke up until the last person I saw when I left
hospital before I left the car was doctor Pensy. So I had therapy
day one. Because all of us had guilt complexes. Several guilt
complexes. One was this: the captain of the flight, I had felt
responsibility for the accident, but that's this they had to
us that, really, there wasn't a lot more that we could have done
airplane to do it, and it took some time, because we all had
complexes about this.
And we all had the why me syndrome. Why did 112 people die,
survive? How do we decide who lives, who dies? Why me? Why did
survive? And that's another thing, that's one of the biggest
of post-traumatic stress. So that's what everybody was working
But the cooperation there was tremendous. The people of Sioux
Sioux-Land, as they like to be called, since it's a four-state
they cooperated, they headed to the airport immediately. And
didn't go out there to see what was going on. They had with them
blankets, clothes, where ever they could be sent to take it.
ended up at Briar Cliff. Often in their cars. A lot of people
in their homes. A lot of people offered their homes for the night.
[click] Does anyone know what that was? I jump at noises, sudden
noises. [laughter] Anyway, they offered their cars, they took
clothes from the people that were soiled by the dirt, by the
took them home, washed them, brought them back. They just did
everything. Over 400 people lined up at the blood bank to give
and there was no call for blood, there was no announcement that
blood, get out there, they were there, they had to turn them
had so many. The cooperation of the people
United Airlines, the cooperation they gave everyone, I was
impressed with that. A lot of people, were upset at first, there
weren't enough people from United to take care of survivors.
have about a five or six person staff at Sioux City. Well, what
did, when they knew this plane was going to crash, they pulled
agents, passenger agents, reservations clerks, right off their
San Fran, Seattle, wherever they could, threw them on the first
available airplane, without even going home, and headed them
City. So by the next morning, or the middle of the next day,
at least one United employee for every family that was there.
think any airline does that, I'm not just saying that's United's
doing. But the cooperation of United with everyone else and us
good. They kind of turned us over to the union. The Airline Pilots
Association and the Association of Flight Attendants kind of
us, relieved the company of any responsibility there. One of
biggest responsibilities is the press. We were not in any condition
talk to the press. We were the survivors of this spectacular
the press wanted to talk to us. The ALPA hired a policeman, they
on my door, they put him on Dudley's door. They didn't need them
Bill and Denny's, they were in intensive care, and you can't
there anyway. But I often wondered if that policeman was on my
keep me in or keep the press out, but whatever it was, it worked.
Because, they left us alone. That's why at the end of five days,
had to hold a press conference because we had held the press
and they were entitled to an interview and to a talk. And so
we held a
press conference and did it that way. But the cooperation from
unions was great.
I've talked about how well the passengers did. But the best
think, came later. And that came from our families, and our friends.
And this is where you can come in, if you know anyone that has
kind of a crisis, or any kind of a trauma in their life. I had
of people tell me, I didn't call you, because I felt you were
be so busy, that I didn't want to bother you. You're not bothering
anybody. If somebody has a crisis or has a trauma, help them:
them, tell them that you're there. Maybe they won't talk to you,
someone else will answer the phone. That's all right. At least,
them a call, let them know you're thinking about them. Let them
you're concerned about them, because that's part of the healing
process. Talking about it is part of the healing process. This
52nd speech on 232. Every time I give it--and I've talked to
doctors about this, and I've asked the psychiatrists about this--every
time I give it, I think I convince myself just a little bit more
there was nothing else I could do. And it's part of my healing
process. To not talk about it, to bury your head in the sand
pretend it didn't happen, you're going to explode someday. So,
somebody wants to talk about a trauma, listen to them. If they
you to talk, you talk about it, and listen to them. But be there
them, and help them. That's very important.
Having a response program is very important. And I'll close--I
make a statement about that, as I close. But first of all, they
we had a little time for questions, if any of you have specific
questions you'd like answered, I'll try to answer them for you.
get too technical on me, now. But if you have some, I'd be happy
try to answer it. Anybody have any? We're going to ask you to
to the microphone, if you don't mind. That's going to cut down
questions, see. [laughter] It also does that, too.
Q: What is your personal opinion of the DC-10 aircraft?
H: I love it. It's a great airplane, I've enjoyed flying it.
flown it, I said, for 9 years as a copilot, and I'll end up flying
four years as a captain. It's my favorite airplane. It's a pilot's
airplane. It's an old man's airplane. You just have to have one
finger and you can fly a lot of it, [laughter] Nothing wrong
copilot, you just have to switch hands, which may be kind of
difficult. No, I love it. It's a great airplane. I have every
confidence in the world in MDC and GE, and this is something
happened, and it's going to happen to any airplane--it's happened
almost any airplane. Maybe not exactly the same thing. It's happened
to a '47, it's happened to an L-1011, similar. I love the airplane.
Q: What do you think of the mandatory age 60 retirement law?
H: I get that every time. Well, this is kind of not the way
your question, but since I'm going to be sixty, this is great.
not United, this is not ALPA, this is not even a lot of my friends,
this is just me. My feeling. As we get older, we hate to admit
but things happen to us. We forget things, we react slowly to
A young pilot can react a lot faster than an older pilot. He
wrong. The senior pilot, the experienced pilot may wait a second
do the right thing, so they kind of balance each other out. But
things as we get older that I'm not so sure our physicals can
A very dear friend of mine was having trouble remembering things.
crews he was flying with accused him of early senility, or drinking
layovers. When they finally diagnosed him, after about a year,
found a tumor the size of an orange in the back of his brain.
this is going on, anytime this is happening in this year, he
had a very serious situation at a very critical time, and we
had problems. This doesn't just happen to 55 year olds, this
to 30 year olds, I know. Until we come up with a very definite
check the medical aspects of a person as he gets older, and until
find a way to check the ability of a pilot--as you get older,
lose some of your abilities, rather than gain some. And you can
fake it. Any pilot, on any given day, can pass a a checkride.
best pilot in the world in a given day can flunk a checkride.
get into that situation, you get into an extended program of
test his competency. SO until we have a better way to test the
competency, and a better way to test the mental and physical
an individual, I think we need an age to stop. I think that's
way to do it, just pick an age. We're going to hurt some people.
just met the other day, or a couple of months ago, a guy down
he's 82 years old, he just decided it was time to retire as a
of acrobatic flying. And he was sharp as a tack. He didn't wear
glasses, could hear, didn't wear a hearing aid, and everything
But he's a freak of nature [laughter]. Well, he's like Nolan
Nolan Ryan, if you're a baseball fan, is a freak of nature. Nobody
years old should be able to throw as hard as he does, and last
as he does, and most pitchers don't. Yeager is another one. Most
age don't have the eyesight Yeager has, and the hearing Yeager
all this sort of thing. But they're exceptions to the rule. The
is, somewhere along the line you should stop. Now, I don't care
it's sixty. Right after I retire, they can make it 65, it's ok
me. But somewhere along the line, we have to have a place to
they can come up with good medicals, and good things, then go
But I think the cost, and everything else--we're all looking
bottom line, and it's just not worth it. Anybody else?
Q: Have you done any commercial flying since?
H: Yes. I went back to work Halloween night, as a matter of
[laughter]. Three months after the accident, I went back to work.
Dudley came back a week later, Bill came back two weeks later.
unfortunately, severed a nerve in his hand that controlled the
function of his hand. Along with that, he broke his arm, and
to put a plate in. While in therapy to fix the arm, the plate
and they had to redo the plate. And so he's been out almost a
just waiting for the arm to heal. But I just head that all of
back, including the flight attendants. I would have gone sooner,
had to wait to get the paperwork done. I had a concussion, so
determined I had to have a neurological exam, and they didn't
until I was ready to go back to work, so I had to take some extra
to do that. I've been flying since October 1989, now. Anything
Q; What were your injuries?
H: My injuries? Just let me go over quickly the injuries of
crew. Bill, sitting right there, had eight broken ribs, hips,
pelvis, he had internal injuries, multiple bruises and contusions.
Sitting in the jumpseat, in the second officer's seat was the
Dennis Fitch. And let me clarify something right there, before
any further, it got out in Sioux City that Denny Fitch came up
over from Dudley Dvorak because Dudley couldn't handle the job,
that really irritated me. Dudley was doing what we asked him
And we'd had him turned around, and started handling those throttles.
If any of you have run through this simulator over here, you
complicated that is. Dudley did not have time to figure out what
power changes it took. So the second time he added power and
corrected by one of us, he looked up to the captain, and said
want this seat? You know what you've been doing here, do you
seat? So that's why the captain was sitting in Dudley's seat,
Dudley was sitting in the jump seat. Cleared that up. Dennis's
injuries were a dislocated left shoulder, a broken right shoulder,
hand, broken rib, other internal injuries, serious internal injuries.
And Dudley suffered a large burn on his right arm, we don't know
that came from, the only burn in the cockpit. He smashed his
ankle, had to have three pins put in that. And he has a permanent
injury. Me, I put a three-inch cut in my right ankle, I bruised
sternum, bruised one rib, and I got fourteen lacerations in my
This ear [left] was almost cut off, and this ear was cut. It
ninety two stitches to sew me up. But I didn't break anything.
Varying degree of injury in that small confine.
Some of our flight attendants, a lot of the passengers, weren't
hurt. The next day, four of the flight attendants walked into
to go home. Three of them looked like they were dressed to go
work. They didn't even get their uniforms dirty.
Q: Were you aware during the slide-out that the airplane ??
H: No. Was I aware? No. As soon as we hit the ground, I went
have absolutely no recollection of anything from the time we
ground until I came to in the cockpit. Trying to figure out where
was. And then we had some conversation, and then the operation
started, and I was in and out throughout the whole thing. I remember
parts of the rescue, I remember parts of the ambulance ride.
remember the ride into town at all. I remember being in the emergency
room, but I don't remember what was going on in there. I was
stomach. They kept me on my stomach. They put me on a thing and
a towel over my head. I think they were writing me off, I'm not
sure. I woke up with a tag on my big toe, I swear I did. [laughter].
They always tag each individual. they put a number on him, and
wherever they found him. And I guess they didn't have a grease
pencil, Dudley they wrote on his foot. But me, they put a tag
big toe. I saw that, and get that thing off of there, right now.
[laughter]. But I don't remember too much about it. In fact,
all in and out. Bill remembers sliding down the runway, sideways,
on the side, like that. And thinking something was going to happen.
But then suddenly the cockpit filled with dirt, and then it started
tumble. And he doesn't recall any tumbling sensation at all.
Q: With what you've learned since the crash, if you found
the same situation, would you do anything different?
H: Well, after going to this simulator I went to this morning,
probably would. For one thing, the inputs to the controls would
lot less than they were. We were shoving the throttles up full
and back again, and it just take very little movement to accomp--
going to go fly the 720 here, and I think it's going to be a
different. But in the F-15, just a little bit of power does it.
basically, I don't think so. I don't know if we'd still try to
yoke. And, of course, it can't happen now, since they've modified
airplane. So we'll have an aileron, and leading edge devices,
slaps, and all that. But to do it again, the answer to that at
press conference was, we didn't know what would happen when we
something at the time, and there's no way I'd try to second-guess
would happen if we tried something else. With the knowledge that
have now- -I don't think so. If I were still going to try to
airplane, which I'd probably do, I'd still have somebody operate
throttles. That's what they do now, they fly the stabilizer with
but they have aileron control. And the best way to do it, really,
to put one guy on the throttles for pitch, and the other to fly
yoke. So I don't think we'd try to do it much different. Except
for a better landing.
Q: Was fuel transfer tried, or would it be tried nowadays?
H: It would probably be tried now, if you had the time. Well,
minutes seems like a lot of time. But we spent the first fifteen
minutes just trying to keep the shiny side up. So we were so
that that we didn't have time to experiment with anything. I
Bob and Mimi on the Aloha accident actually had time to fly the
airplane, and the presence of mind to see how many flaps they
down, and how slowly they could fly, and so forth. This airplane
flying its own speed. We had very little control. And the phugoids.
We went down as low as 180 knots. And went right up as high as
300 knots, that sort of thing. So we didn't really have the time
see how slow we could go or how we could fly it. I wish we had,
Q: Is MDC looking at any redesign of the isolation of the
lines that caused the emergency?
H: My understanding is that the MD-11, as well as the DC-10,
to be, well, the DC-10's are, fixed with a fuse in the #3 hydraulic
system. An excessive flow or low quantity in the #3 system will
that fuse and direct no more fluid to the tail. And the fluid
directed to one aileron, the leading edge slats, the nose wheel
steering brakes, and so forth, so you that you can fly the airplane.
The tail is now operated off a special motor that drives the
stabilizer. It's a flying tail. You have no elevators, but you
stabilizer trim. We had no trim at all in the airplane. You fly
pitch of the airplane with the throttles and the stab trim, and
steer the airplane with the ailerons. And as I understand, that's
the fix on the 11. What they're going to do with the 12, i have
idea, or the 777, or some of those airplanes. They're going to,
think, strictly FBW, and I have no idea how they're going to
I don't even know what that means, really. They tried to tell
Q: What was your speed when the engine let go?
We were doing 272 knots. We were at cruise, M = 0.83, 272,
thought that was the airspeed the airplane wanted to fly. Engineers
told us later that when the engine blew, the disk and the fan,
six feet in diameter, that whole thing went out, and tore this
whole in the side of the airplane, the housing, not the airplane,
when that thing went out and changed the trim speed to 215 knots
something like that. Then we put the gear down and got to a lower
altitude, and the trim speed was then, in effect, with the burning
the fuel, was lowered to another thing.
Did I ever answer your question about transferring fuel?
We didn't. We thought about it now, but at the time we didn't.
dumped as much as we could. In the DC-10, you have to have 33,000
some-odd pounds left after you dump, it's an automatic shutoff,
can't stop it, you can't control it, it's going to stop itself.
have to have that much fuel, unfortunately.
Q: ?? Are there ever any emergency situations where a decision
be made so quickly that ??
H: The only one I can think of right off the bat that did
happened to us again was the Colorado Springs 737 where at about
he suddenly in six seconds went from level normal flight to over
back and into the ground. Who's going to make a decision in six
seconds, I don't know. That's the only time where your reaction
would have to be such--for example, in our case, Bill's reaction
was ahead of mine. So his reaction was fine. If we had been right
close to the ground, one of us would have had to react, but the
got to come in, where you could have a little time to discuss.
Well, I thank you for being here. It's very important to me.
around now giving these talks. And unfortunately I don't have
time to sit around and see that we do it in Seattle. But preparation
for a disaster is very important. The things you do here at Edwards
AFB may prevent a lot of disasters. It would probably prevent
if we could ever put into use what they're working with right
Dryden. But you're not going to stop all the disasters, no matter
hard you try. And there's all kinds. There's not just airplane
crashes, there's train crashes, there's hurricanes, tornadoes,
certainly earthquakes, that can spread disaster over a pretty
area, which can require communication and emergency effort. So
a good, workable emergency plan is very important.
On July 18, 1989, 112 of us--passengers and crew of 232--did
survive, and I hope you will remember them, and think of them,
you have occasion to recall the events of 232. But 184 of us
I think that's due largely in part to the fact that Sioux City
airport and the surrounding communities were prepared to respond
practiced, organized, updated emergency plan. So what I ask of
although you're probably aren't familiar with it now, is to go
your own communities, and look into your emergency plans, check
those people that make them and determine that such a disaster
your community, would you be as prepared, and more importantly,
Thank you for your time this morning. Appreciate it.
Capt. Haynes refers to flying the F-15 simulation here at
Here's an article from Dryden's newspaper which discusses it.
>From ``The X-Press'', 31 May 1991:
Study paves way for control of crippled aircraft
A massive hydraulic failure disables the flight controls of
miles from the nearest airport. Is a crash landing inevitable?
Not necessarily. An engineering study at Dryden shows that
multi-engine aircraft with specially programmed flight control
can touch down safely using just the engines to turn and land.
NASA's study resulted fro several recent incidents in which
hydraulic control systems on large aircraft failed during flight.
pilots were left with little or no capability to land normally
ailerons, rudder and elevators.
Engineers at Dryden are doing the work on a simulator programmed
look at the engine-only handling and flying qualities of a variety
aircraft, including large transports and a twin-engine jet fighter.
According to Bill Burcham, chief of Dryden's Propulsion and
Branch and the study's initiator, the next major step will be
the digital flight control system in NASA's F-15 research aircraft
proof-of-concept flights. The flight program, done in cooperation
the U. S. Air Force, could take place within the next 18 to 24
pending formal approval.
The system tested at Dryden is solely for research and is
for operational use on existing aircraft. data from current and
phases of the studies will be available to the aircraft industry
possible application to commercial and military planes.
Disastrous flight control system failures are rare in commercial
aircraft, said Burcham, ``but if you can save just one aircraft
years, the system is worth it.''
The augmented flight control system on a disabled aircraft
the pilot's stick inputs and convey them into engine throttle
Burcham said. The flight control system would automatically program
the engines to turn the aircraft, climb and descend, and eventually
land safely by varying the speed of the engines individually
In the Dryden study, the engineer-pilot research team used
simulator to compare handling and control characteristics of
four-engine jet transport and the NASA F-15. They ``flew'' the
aircraft in both the augmented mode and with manual engine control
using hand throttles.
The comparative study showed both types of aircraft can be
somewhat by manual engine control during level flight and benign
maneuvers, but they are extremely difficult to land. In the augmented
mode, safe flight and landings are possible even in turbulence
Preliminary flight evaluations by NASA pilots in the F-15
and in two
business-size aircraft (a twin jet and a twin propeller) verified
simulator predictions that some control is possible using just
throttles. But landing tasks are extremely difficult unless the
control system has been tailored for engine control.
The engine-control idea is limited to multi-engine aircraft
electronic engine and flight control systems It can be applied
either jet or propeller-driven aircraft.
Other members of the Dryden study team are research pilot
Fullerton; Jim Stewart, F-15 Flight Research Facility project
Glenn Gilyard, Propulsion and Performance Branch; and Tom Wolf,
Integrated Test and Simulation.
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